Paragraph after paragraph of heart-rending, maudlin emotional manipulation over the tragic fate of the cherubic little scholar whose only wish is to learn math, but whose test scores will inevitably fall below those of his classmates due to his Dickensian plight; hungry, cold, and homeless, yet cruelly expected to learn as well as his advantaged peers, though his frozen little fingers are too numb to grip a pencil and his stomach rumbles even after the meagre gruel the school provides him for breakfast…

Then, an entire section is devoted to exploring the city’s budget for accommodating homeless people at public expense, the message being that the government is failing in its responsibility to this kid by not providing free housing for him and his family.

Not a word is mentioned about any parental responsibility for getting their kid into this situation, nor for their responsibility to get the kid out of it. In fact, his parents are barely mentioned at all, other than to say that they sold all their possessions and moved to SF in September because his dad thought he had a job lined up which didn’t work out.

What compelled them to pack up and move without any savings? Was it bad luck, desperation, stupidity, some combination of the above? Are they looking for work? Do they have friends or relatives in other cities? Did their savings run out? Were there unexpected medical expenses or something like that? They’ve only been there for a few months, if the job didn’t work out, why don’t they move somewhere less expensive to live than the second-most-expensive city in the US, and to somewhere with better employment prospects for non-professionals? Why are they staying in San Francisco rather than moving somewhere cheaper? Who knows? The reporter didn’t even ask any of these questions.

To be absolutely clear, I am not against emergency public assistance to help those genuinely in need get back on their feet and begin to help themselves. Perhaps the family genuinely does need and deserve help. I don’t know; the reporter didn’t bother to tell us.

What I am against is the notion that the government (that is, the taxpayer) ought to function as a free-flowing money spigot without limits for anyone, forever. This is the mindset that informs both this article and the left wing of the Democratic Party generally. The only question asked is, “why is the government not doing more to help these people?” This could be a great question to ask in certain contexts. It should not stand alone as the only question to ask. The government should help, yes; but it should not be the primary responsible party. The key element of personal and parental responsibility is entirely absent from this discussion.

It didn’t even occur to the reporter to ask such very basic questions about their situation because these more extreme versions of the postmodernist-liberal worldview include a complete abdication of all personal responsibility for one’s situation in life. The individual is considered a mere kite in the social wind whose thin tether has broken loose, buffeted about by forces entirely beyond his control and with which only a massive and benevolent government bureaucracy can possibly contend. It’s all up to the government to save this family from the consequences of their bad luck and poor planning, to the extent that questions revolving around the details of the situation are not considered worth mentioning at all, in favor of a discussion of how woefully little money the government is spending on fixing the situation.

Indeed, the notion that government spending programs are the sole answer to this situation is taken entirely for granted in that article and not even an issue; the only point of contention is exactly how much more than present levels the government ought to be spending to fix things. Even then, “the government finding the parents jobs” is not floated as a solution; the government ought to just give them a free apartment for as long as they like, apparently.

Anyone who dares suggest that parents have any sort of primary responsibility to provide for their kid rather than the city government and the taxpayer is dismissed out of hand by the far-left as a cruel and unfeeling monster, etc.

Well, awareness of the deeper dynamics is the first step towards halting this trend. There you go.

Libyan Oil Production

• Prewar Libyan oil production capacity ≈ 1.8 million bbl/day in 2010.
• Prewar Libyan oil actual production in 2010 ≈ 1.65 million bbl/day. (ibid.)
• Libyan Proven reserves ≈ 46.4 billion barrels. (ibid.)
• Libyan reserves tend to be high quality light (high API gravity), sweet (low-sulfur) oil. (ibid.)
• “the vast majority” of Libyan oil is exported to Europe (85%); 5% is exported to the US. (ibid.)
• Libyan oil sells for an average price of $117.13 per bbl, as opposed to the world average of $113.87. For reference, Saudi light (high-quality) goes for $114.87; Saudi heavy (low-quality) oil goes for $110.43/bbl; and Mexican Maya heavy goes for $103.29 / bbl.
• For comparison:
• US domestic proven reserves ≈ 20 billion barrels.
• US domestic daily production ≈ 7.48 million bbl /day.
• Saudi production ≈ 9.78 million bbl/day.
• Saudi proven reserves ≈ 266.7 billion bbl. (ibid.)
• World oil production ≈ 86.8 million bbl/day.
• World proven reserves (2009) ≈ 1,341 billion bbl.
• The US government estimates that OPEC immediately available surplus production capacity is 1.5 to 2 million bbl/day, excluding Iraq and Venezuela; over half of this capacity is in Saudi Arabia.
• The Saudis claim to have surplus capacity of 4 million bbl/day.
• Western oil companies are well represented in Libya (“Eni, Total, Repsol YPF, StatoilHydro, Occidental, OMV, ConocoPhillips, Hess, Marathon, Shell, BP, ExxonMobil and others.”)

Cost of NATO intervention in Libya

• £260 million to the end of June to Britain
• $716 million through June 3rd to the US alone.
• €160 million to France through July 10th.
• Operations began March 17th.)

Libyan oil production analysis

And it came to pass, that Goldman’s then-chief overlord was order’d to parade full 7 days and 7 nights through the streets of lower Manhattan, clad in naught save his drawers, bearing tether’d to heavy chains every SEC filing that Goldman hath wrought for 10 years previous; while the peasants of the borough were to gather round to hurl rotting vegetables thence, and cry, “Lo! How the mighty have fallen!”

And only then, once the indignity were suffer’d in full, might he retreat to his penthouse to recover, or to his yacht, or to the coffers of his chalet in southern France, or to his Bahamas estate countinghouse, or to any other sequester’d location whatsoever.

What, exactly, does he say? Let’s look at his own words:

But how we can better explain and formulate a security policy toward China using a constructivist approach?

The answer lies in the social interactions and cultural norms that shape common identities, while the interests of the state can facilitate intersubjective (or shared) understandings conducive to the improving of cross-strait relations.

For instance, Beijing and Taipei are now on a conciliatory path because of shared understandings — such as the “one China, different interpretations” policy, the premise that cross-strait peace requires China to desist with its military threats and Taiwan not pushing toward independence.

Constructivist Errors

In short, he says that China-Taiwan relations have improved because, in a show of empowerment, people in both countries are constructing a new reality and a new concept of China through their social interactions, as embodied in the “One China, different interpretations” policy.

This requires thinking that reality is something socially constructed, first of all, which I obviously don’t. And it requires believing that these social contacts are the driving force behind policy set by the elites, rather than policy being the driving force behind the social contacts.

Despite cromulent wishing, ordinary people are not quite yet embiggened

The emphasis on “social interactions that shape common identities” as the putative basis for the present improved Chinese-Taiwanese relations is derived from an ongoing and well-meaning but misguided effort to de-institutionalize the concept of power, which crops up across the postmodernist spectrum. Present postmodernists are engaged in a self-delusional attempt to democratize the conception of “power” into something “done” by ordinary people (those who are “empowered,” anyway, a killer pomo buzzword), rather than as the acts of distant institutions of the elite which are beyond the individual’s purview. (This is, incidentally, an idea that postmodernist thought appropriates from liberalism, as part of its general klepto-philosophic program.) They cannot stomach the idea that our fate, both as individuals and as a society, is largely determined by forces beyond our control, so they imagine (or construct, if you prefer) a reality in which that is not the case. Granted, it’s not exactly a happy thought, that some faraway leader who I’ve never even met could push me into a war tomorrow, but because it is unpleasant does not make it untrue.

The most cursory reading of history shows this to be the case. If not, are we to believe instead that the ordinary people of, say, Germany in 1938 just really, really hated Poles, on a personal level? that ordinary Japanese of 1941 really despised the United States? and a hundred thousand other similar examples? Of course not. Ordinary people don’t care for war until they are whipped into a fervor by a very small group of leaders, who can, in many cases, guide them to whatever path they choose. Unpleasant? Sure, but we must confront that, rather than bury our heads in the sands of Pollyanna optimism and pretend as though we as individuals have some kind of power that we only wish for.

… and the real power-brokers just don’t care much about “cultural identity”

The idea that mainland Chinese and Taiwanese relations are built, somehow, upon the mutual construction of an intersubjective identity is absurd, not to mention incredibly naive. (It is “absurd” philosophically, derived from the inherent nonsense of phenomenology, for reasons that must wait until another day to be elaborated. The short version, omitting many details, is that an objective reality exists apart from our perceptions of it, at least until a repeatable experiment demonstrates otherwise, and failure to notice that is a serious illness called “schizophrenia.” cf. Karl Popper.)

Sure, Taiwan and China share an ethnic heritage and a language and a culture, but these are relatively minor factors. International relations are generally determined mainly by power and money, at times by pragmatic cooperation for mutual benefit, and yes, even by altruism occasionally. Identity is not nearly as important a factor as the constructivists would have it. When PRC and ROC diplomats meet, are they talking about trade and guns and money, or are they exchanging sweet and sour chicken recipes and reciting Tao Qian?

All else the same, two groups from the same cultural background will prefer one another, but all else is certainly not the same in the case of China and Taiwan. Just look at US-UK economic relations over the entire postwar period: despite close security ties which are undoubtedly culturally rooted (i.e. the US and UK may not like each other all that much, but they like each other much better than either likes anyone else), economic cooperation has been far less apparent — the UK needed a humiliating IMF bailout in 1976. where was the USA? — and the “Special Relationship” has looked rather frayed on more than one occasion, not the least of which is the currently waning public support in Britain for the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.

English School Explanation

So, we’ve deconstructed the deconstruction. Now we are left with the more positive task of providing an alternate, and better, explanation for the present state of Taiwanese-Chinese relations.

As a point of fact, both the PRC and ROC governments have endorsed the “One China, different interpretations” policy. As another point of fact, there has been a notable détente in cross-strait relations, with increased trade and tourism and decreased (though remaining) military provocation.

Realists and liberals

Realists would argue that the PRC, being fully aware of the United States’ vast investment in and concominant commitment to the defense of Taiwan, agreed to this policy as a face-saving way to avoid a costly and possibly unwinnable war with the United States… at least for now. In the meantime, the PRC is happy to trade with Taiwan and make some cash with which to patiently build up its military might. Taiwan, for its part, is obviously aware that it would be largely destroyed in any US-China conflict, so it has agreed to “One China” as a general self-preservation measure. Unsure of the United States’ long-term commitment to it, it trades to accumulate its own power, so as to hopefully become enough of a potential military problem that China will judge itself better off trading than fighting at some point in the future.

Liberals characterize the situation more simply, as one of mutual benefit; they have both realized that they are better off trading than fighting. Nonetheless, they must save face. The “One China” charade is simply a face-saving measure to preserve a semblance of national pride. (Marxists might add, “… while the elites of both countries rake in profits behind the scenes.”)

Liberal Realism, or, the English School

I think they’re both right. The best explanation is a fusion of the liberal and realist positions. The realists go too far in assuming that international relations is a zero-sum game, while the liberals fail to appreciate the anarchic and power-hungry aspect of things. Liberals are too optimistic and realists are too pessimistic.

China, or at least a large faction of its leadership, definitely still wants Taiwan. They would probably take it today if they thought they could get away with it, but they know they can’t. So they will settle for making lots of money from Taiwanese trade in the meantime, while they figure out what to do (or, who will be in charge.) In time, this conciliatory but transient harmony could congeal into a more permanent arrangement, maybe, as more and more of the power elites in both countries realize that the benefits of cooperation outweigh fighting (but, though likely, it will not necessarily do so.)

Note that the ordinary people are largely irrelevant in this analysis, not because I am just a very mean person and don’t like democracy, but as a de facto statement of reality rather than choosing candy-coated empowering wishful thinking. The ordinary people can usually be brought around to whatever the elites decide.

This is, in my opinion, a far more compelling and realistic analysis than positing the metaphysical mutual co-construction of some entirely new aspect of Chinese reality through social interaction and discourse. Mainland Chinese like making money. Taiwanese like making money. The mainland would love to take over Taiwan and use their resources to make even more money, but they are externally constrained (by the US) from doing so for the forseeable future, so they aren’t. Being self-interested as well as not intrinsically warlike, and indeed sharing a common cultural bond (though it not be the major factor), they gradually soften their position, bit by bit, and engage in trade as part of a general normalization of relations. No magical thinking required.